Synopsis The failure of the centralized state, both in economic and political governance, has swung the pendulum in favour of decentralized systems across the globe in recent years. Making a successful transition to decentralized governance, however, is a formidable challenge. Indian federalism is at a crossroad. On one hand, the legacy of colonialism, partition, and the vision of nation-building have contrived to create a centralized federation. On the other, the ongoing transition to a free market has brought contradictions of centralized federal arrangements to the fore. This book deals with the systems, institutions, and outcomes from the interplay of political and economic forces in Indian federalism. It attempts to broaden the conceptual framework for analysing Indian federalism by exploring political elements and institutions and their strategic interaction with fiscal variables. It further emphasizes the emergence of coalition governments at the centre, and the increasing importance of regional parties which have brought out the contradictions in the efficient governance of the federation. This synthesized framework, incorporating economic perspectives on political institutions, more comprehensively than ever attempted before, will be immensely valuable for policymakers, foreign lending agencies technocrats, journalists, and NGOs. Students of Indian political economy as well as general readers will also find it useful.