Synopsis Non-proliferation concerns have often been shrugged off by nations for short-term and short-sighted strategic interests. The present relationship between Pakistan and the US is a case in point. Though a member of the NPT, coupled with non-proliferation as its foreign policy, the US has been turning a blind eye to Pakistan's long and avid quest for nuclear weapons-primarily to serve its own short-term strategic interests in the regions. Pakistan, well aware of this, has exploited the situation to full. The focus of this work is to determine whether the Western experts' apprehensions on the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear installations and fissile materials are well founded or an exaggeration. The decades-old nuclear trade between Pakistan and other countries has also been discussed with a view to highlighting the fact that A. Q. Khan's proliferation linkages did not come as a surprise to the US, emphasizing the point that Washington had been turning a blind eyes to the nuclear linkages and programmes for its own strategic interests. The study also holds that NPT has been unsuccessful in controlling nuclear proliferation and suggests ways to curb further proliferation.